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1The state’s contradictory response to the exploitation of 
immigrant workers: the UK case
Lea Sitkin
In 2004, the bodies of 21 Chinese illegal immigrants were found on the shores of 
Morecombe Bay in the northwest of England. Hired by gangmasters to pick cockles – a 
type of British shellfish delicacy – the group, mostly made up of young men in their 20s 
and 30s, were trapped by incoming tides and died as a result. The high-profile tragedy 
threw a spotlight on the underground world of local gangmasters and more generally, 
highlighted the risks and dangers of clandestine migration into the British economy.
The reaction of the British state to the exploitation of immigrant workers – as well as 
native workers – has been to criminalize the actors directly committing the abuses. 
Immediately following the Morecombe Bay tragedy, the then-Labour government 
introduced the Gangmasters Licensing Act 2004, which requires all labour providers in 
the agriculture, food processing and shellfish gathering industries to be licensed by a 
centralized authority, on pain of criminal sanction.i That same year, the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act introduced criminal offences for trafficking 
for the purposes of slavery and forced labour.ii This was the first time that trafficking for 
non-sexual offences had been subject to criminal law. The Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Act 2006 repealed previous legislation on employer sanctions and 
introduced a civil penalty regime alongside a criminal offence for knowingly employing 
adults subject to immigration controls. The number of employers subject to sanction has 
increased dramatically since the introduction of the civil penalty regime, although 
2criminal prosecution figures remain low (Aliverti 2013: 44). Following criticism of the 
UK legal regime on forced labour in two cases before the European Court of Human 
Rights,iii the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 created criminal offences of holding 
another person in slavery or servitude or requiring them to perform forced or 
compulsory labour (s.71). Most recently, Home Secretary Theresa May has pledged a 
“modern-day slavery crackdown”, promising new criminal offences, greater resources 
allocated to enforcement and tougher sanctions for traffickers and gangmasters.iv
In these endeavours, the British state takes on a particular role as the protector of 
exploited workers, placed in direct opposition to a guilty party – the greedy employer; 
the trafficker, the gangmaster – whose nefarious practices it is trying to control. 
However, framing the issue in such a way denies the state’s complicity in rendering a 
specific group of workers – immigrant workers – uniquely vulnerable to exploitation 
(Anderson 2010). In particular, a burgeoning body of literature argues that it is the fact 
that migrant workers face a constant threat of arrest, imprisonment, detention and 
ultimately deportation that undermines their ability to negotiate on an equal footing with 
employers (Bauder 2006; Calavita 1992; Calavita 1998; Calavita 2003; De Genova 
2002; De Genova 2004; De Giorgi 2006; De Giorgi 2007; De Giorgi 2010; Escobar 
2010 ; Melossi 2003; Nagels and Rea 2010; Palidda 2005; Palidda 2009; Wacquant 
1999). In this analysis, borders operate not to exclude foreign nationals, but rather as 
flexible gateways that define immigrants’ subordinate position in host country labour 
markets. In turn, as the enforcer of border control, the state plays an integral role in 
fostering foreign nationals’ subordinated inclusion in the workplace.
3The relationship between immigration status and exploitation is most acute for irregular 
immigrants, who fear that their employers – and indeed, anyone aware of their legal 
situation – may denounce them to the authorities. In turn, employers and other parties 
use the threat of denunciation to the authorities as a method of exerting extra control 
over immigrants (Heyman 1998). However, the threat of detention and deportation also 
affects regular immigrants’ labour market behaviours, since their immigration status is 
often tied to specific employment obligations such as the requirement to stay with a 
particular employer, or a compulsory ‘live-in’ aspect. Where workers do not abide by 
these conditions, they – like irregular immigrants – are liable to deportation. Thus, these 
conditions work so as to “cheapen the labour power of a growing number of people 
once they are inside the country and to leave them vulnerable to all forms of market 
relations” (Sharma 2001: 417). Furthermore, borders’ “power-effects” are projected 
inside the nation-state through the institutionalisation of a stratified system of socio-
legal entitlement that limits the options available to immigrants who are seeking to meet 
their basic needs (Bloch 2000). Far from being a neutral and objective dispenser of 
justice, the unique power of the employer over his or her foreign worker is propped up 
by the state.
The present chapter explores the contradictory response of the state: on the one hand, 
criminalizing those perpetrating abuses; and on the other, fostering immigrant workers’ 
particular susceptibility to exploitation. To this end, it analyzes the conditions attached 
to four different types of immigration status currently available in the UK: Tier 2 
(general) visas, domestic workers in private households, A2 nationals working under the 
“freedom of establishment” and finally, irregularly resident workers. Importantly, 
4understanding the effect of immigration status on workplace requires an analysis of 
immigration law’s interaction with other bodies of law, most notably, labour and social 
welfare law. Data for the chapter was collected through legal methodology (most 
notably, the collection and analysis of cases), official statistics, academic and ‘grey’ 
literature reviews, and finally, semi-structured interviews with lawyers, migrant rights 
activists and immigrant workers, recruited through snowball sampling. As a non-random 
method of sampling, snowball sampling is limited in terms of its representativeness. 
Importantly, the chapter does not argue that the experiences discussed in this chapter 
happen to all immigrant workers – instead, it intends to illuminate the ways in which 
immigration status leaves immigrants in an institutionally vulnerable position.
The chapter concludes that the current government have employed a dual tactic of 
criminalizing the immediate perpetrators of exploitation and restricting avenues for 
legal immigration. In turn, these efforts obfuscate wider issues of labour regulation and 
immigration policy (Fudge and Strauss 2013: 13). Although the European Courts offer 
some possibilities for challenges to the UK’s legal regime, the essential political 
tensions between the desire to protect business interests, limit immigration and protect 
immigration workers’ rights means that it is likely that the contradictory legal regime on 
migrant workers’ exploitation will continue, with devastating consequences for those 
caught in its net.
WORK PERMIT HOLDERS
The UK used to have an ‘open’ labour migration category for highly skilled migrants, 
which allowed anyone with a sufficient number of ‘points’ to immigrate to the UK and 
look for work or self-employment opportunities. Significantly, the ‘Tier 1 (General)’ 
5category for highly skilled immigrants did not require applicants to have a job offer nor 
a sponsoring employer. Foreign nationals on this visa enjoyed total freedom of 
occupation and the ability to change employer. Subsequently, the coalition government 
has realigned the immigration admissions system, so that “sponsorship is at the heart”v 
of the immigration system. In the UK, the largest labour migration category – 
accounting for 35% of visas in 2010 – was Tier 2, for “foreign nationals who have been 
offered a skilled job to fill a gap in the workforce that cannot be filled by a settled 
worker.”vi There is a quota of 21,000 places for jobs paying below £152,000; jobs 
paying more than this do not fall within the limitation.
The stated aim of the program is to attract the ‘best and brightest’ of a highly skilled and 
mobile global elite. However, critics have warned that the restrictions contained within 
the Tier 2 visa program are likely to discourage would-be applicants, who are aware of 
the implications of these conditions. The key issue is the lack of ‘employment 
portability’ – that is, the ability to change employment. Visa holders are not allowed to 
take employment outside of that which is stated in the Certificate of Sponsorship – and 
they face deportation if they lose their job.vii Furthermore, since April 2012, a cooling 
off period has been in operation, which means that any Tier 2 migrant whose visa has 
been cancelled or has expired and who has left the UK having not made a fresh in-
country application is subject to a 12 month ban from making an application to reapply 
in the same category. Thus, Tier 2 workers are reliant on their employer not only for 
their livelihood, but for their right to stay in the country. This leaves workers on this 
program vulnerable to a form of “hyper-dependence”,viii which goes beyond the 
6personal dependence and subordination British nationals experience in their 
employment relationships.
Employers have been known to take advantage of immigration status and the threat of 
deportation as a means of exercising control over work permit holders, including 
forbidding union membership (Walia 2010). Although it is difficult to conclude how 
widespread this issue is, a survey of employment advisors carried out by the Trade 
Unions Congress found that 39 per cent of advisers were commonly or very commonly 
approached by migrant workers whose employers had threatened to deport them if they 
reported problems at work (Trade Union Congress 2007: 53). Similarly, Alan Ritchie of 
construction union UCATT said: “Bosses often falsely suggest that workers will be 
deported if they join unions or report abuses.”ix 
Furthermore, migrants on work permits may be conscious enough of this possibility to 
police themselves through, for example, working for less money, avoiding industrial 
disputes and more generally, staying with an unsatisfactory employer (Anderson 2010). 
Migrant workers consistently claim that the lack of freedom to change employers is the 
main reason for remaining in exploitative conditions (MRCI 2010). This self-regulation 
may in fact be more widespread than overt threats on the behalf of the employer: as one 
respondentx said ‘Employers don’t threaten... [because immigrants] never complain’. 
Similarly, a lawyer interviewed for the study argued that:
even the legal people…they are often asked to do more than their colleagues, 
they are often asked to do the work that isn’t most people’s cup of tea...and 
7naturally their chance for promotion is less because it’s the type of job that 
people don’t want to do and you have less opportunity to shine. The reason why 
is that they know, their visa, Tier 2, must be attached to that employer. If you 
want to change, they cannot. So, in a way, the company implies that, just be 
nice, at least for five years. And a lot of people suffer in silence.
(immigration solicitor, interviewee 3, 20 June 2012)
Finally, the lack of employment portability undermines possibilities for migrants to 
access Employment Tribunals, should they want to enforce a claim. In the UK, an 
employer may withdraw the Certificate of Sponsorship at any time if the work finishes 
or is no longer available or if the worker is unsuitable and the migrant will have to leave 
the UK within 60 days if they have not found another authorised sponsor. The 
predictable result of this condition is that “if [Tier 2 visa holders] get dismissed…it can 
be difficult to remain in the UK for a sufficient time when the case is going on, 
financially…and maybe they can’t stay in the country …and some employers will use 
that to their advantage”(immigration solicitor, ibid). The only exception to the 
requirement to leave the country occurs in cases of suspected trafficking, when a 45 day 
reflection and recovery period means victims cannot be deported. This right follows the 
UK’s ratification of the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on Actions against 
Trafficking in Human Beings in 2008. However, leave beyond this reflection period is 
discretionary. Furthermore, as former Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the 
Home Office Mr. Alan Campbell has spoken about, immigration officers are often 
suspicious that irregular migrants might be claiming to be victims in order to get round 
immigration rules.xi Most of all, the ‘grace period’ only applies to trafficking and not to 
8other labour market crimes and offences. Thus, the vast majority of immigrants on work 
permits do not have the practical means to prosecute or make claims against their 
employers.
FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT: A NEW HOLE IN THE LEGAL REGIME
A great deal of intra-European labour mobility occurs under the aegis of the freedom of 
establishment and of services, as opposed to the freedom of movement of workers. The 
freedom of establishment (Art 49) includes “the right to take up and pursue activities as 
self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings in other EU states”. 
While the transitional restrictions on Romania and Bulgaria meant that nationals of 
these countries had restrictions on their right to work as employees, their right to 
freedom of establishment was unaffected, meaning they could work as self-employed. 
The predictable result of this has been a siphoning of Romanian and Bulgarian 
immigrants into self-employment. Although official statistics are not kept, estimates 
suggest that the rate of self-employment is 42 per cent among nationals from these 
countries – around five times higher than the rate among the previous generation of East 
European accession immigrants, whose immigration to the UK was not limited by 
transitional arrangements (Rolfe 2013: 24). For example, the UK construction labour 
market shows a ratio of 11 to 1 in terms of self-employment over direct employment 
from workers entering from East Europe (Memorandum, UCATT 2009).xii
For optimists, increases in self-employment reflect a change in work attitudes within the 
labour force: a trend towards a new spirit of entrepreneurism and more autonomous 
concepts of work (Gottschall and Kroos 2003: 5). Undoubtedly, many self-employed 
9workers are not in a precarious situation, but instead enjoy the ‘non-pecuniary’ 
advantages of self-direction and flexibility that being one’s own boss affords (Benz and 
Frey 2008a; Benz and Frey 2008b). Nonetheless, the funnelling of East European 
nationals into self-employment has a number of troubling consequences in terms of 
vulnerability to precarious work. 
In particular, self-employment is associated with fewer workplace rights in the UK. In 
British law, employees are subject to labour law, a body of law introduced to intervene 
in the employment contract and compensate for the market-based subordination of the 
employee vis-à-vis the employer (Perulli 2003: 6). Recent legislation has established a 
second category of ‘worker’, which is used for agency workers, with most (not all) of 
the same rights as employees. These apply to all contracts where an individual agrees to 
personally carry out work without running a genuine business of their own and include 
working time, minimum wage levels, disability discrimination, part-time work and 
protection from unauthorised wage deductions (Böheim and Muehlberger 2006).
By contrast, self-employed persons are understood as their own bosses and seen as 
equal to the parties they contract with. This distinction is reflected in the legal 
construction of a difference between contract of services and contract for services. 
Instead of employment law, the self-employed are subject to civil and commercial law 
(Buschoff and Schmidt 2009). This means they do not have employment rights, because 
they are their “own boss and can therefore decide, for example, how much to charge for 
[their] work and how much holiday to give [themselves]”.xiii Although they have the 
right not to be discriminated againstxiv and are entitled to a safe and healthy working 
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environment on their client’s premises, they are exempt from some of the most basic 
employment rights, including the statutory minimum wage,xv legislation on working 
time and rest breaks and unauthorized deductions of pay. Instead of claiming for unfair 
dismissal in an employment tribunal, they claim for a breach in contract in a small 
claims court.xvi 
Secondly, self-employed persons have fewer social rights. Indeed, the fiscal incentives 
to opt for self-employment are bought at the expense of some longer term disadvantages 
in terms of access to state benefits. In the UK, the general contractor – that is, the person 
who enters into a contract with the self-employed worker - avoids the National 
Insurance contribution, which constitutes around 12.8 per cent of employees’ gross 
wage payment. At the same time, the self-employed worker pays a lower contribution, 
representing in a saving of about 7 per cent on gross earning (Briscoe, Dainty and 
Millett 2000). However, exclusion from contributions means that self-employed 
workers are excluded from sick pay and contribution-based unemployment benefit. 
These benefits are important in terms of avoiding exploitation because they give 
workers means of survival should they fall ill or leave their employment. Furthermore, 
deprived of any pension entitlements, self-employed workers face an old age of means-
tested poverty – unless, without a designated retirement age, they work until they die 
(Harvey 2001). 
Finally, much self-employment is ‘bogus’: that is, it does not reflect the reality of the 
employment relationship. This issue is particularly acute with the UK’s construction 
industry: one estimate suggests that as many as 80 per cent of the taxed self-employed 
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would be designated employees, if they were to go to employment tribunal (ibid: 21). It 
is extremely difficult to control bogus self-employment, particularly where both the 
employer and employee are complicit. Demonstrating the mismatch between the 
contract – or, if there is no written contract, the actual terms of engagement – and the 
reality of the working situation can be extremely difficult. Furthermore, self-
employment is defined according to numerous dimensions which carry equal weighting. 
This means that many circumstances fall into a grey zone between ‘pure’ self-
employment and employment. In the UK, the challenge of prosecuting bogus self-
employment is also complicated by the use of agencies or payroll service companies 
(Elliot 2009). Once an individual signs a contract with the third pay company, they no 
longer have a legal relationship with the general contractor but instead are legally 
defined as self-employed subcontractors or ‘freelance operatives’ of the payroll 
company itself. The implication of this is that the general contractor is protected from 
liability for employment or tax issues – despite the fact that they retain the right to 
‘negotiate the provision of labour’ with the ‘freelance operative’ (Elliot 2009). To date, 
none of the legal challenges initiated by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
against payroll companies have been successful.
Romanian and Bulgarian workers who are ‘bogus self-employed’ find themselves in a 
particularly difficult situation. Instead of being reinstated as employees – and 
reimbursed for the wages/social rights that they were previously excluded from - they 
are often dismissed. A particularly noteworthy case was the dismissal of 200 Romanian 
workers on the Olympic Park site, after inspectors from the UK Border Agency found 
that they were, in reality, working in an employment relationship.xvii Notably, the 
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construction union UCATT supported the Romanian workers’ dismissal, given the ban 
they had negotiated on self-employment on the Olympic Park site. In this case, limiting 
A2 nationals to self-employment constituted a real life, de-facto restriction on their 
employment portability. 
DOMESTIC WORKERS
In February 2012, the government announced that instead of abolishing the overseas 
domestic work visa,xviii it would limit its duration to a maximum of six months, with no 
extensions, or until the employer leaves the UK, which ever was sooner. A migrant 
domestic worker may only enter the UK with a non-British employer who has been 
granted the right to reside in the UK through a separate category, or with a returning UK 
expatriate. These (mainly female) workers come from a variety of countries such as 
India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka, while their employers are mainly 
Middle Eastern, Indian or British nationals (Wittenburg 2008: 5). The program is 
intended to make the UK attractive to wealthy transnational migrants by allowing them 
to relocate not only themselves but also their households, including their domestic staff 
(Fudge and Strauss 2013: 2). In 2012, around 15,553 visas were granted in the 
‘domestic worker in private household category’.xix   
Domestic workers are some of the most vulnerable workers in the UK. In general, the 
home-based nature of domestic employment poses unique challenges in terms of 
monitoring living and working conditions. Furthermore, employers’ discomfort with the 
idea of bringing a market relationship into the home can translate into blurry boundaries 
in terms of what it is appropriate to ask the worker to carry out (Anderson 2007). In 
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such cases, the idea of the domestic worker as a ‘member of the family’, rather than an 
employee, obfuscates the duty of the employer to respect the worker’s employment 
rights, as well as their right to privacy and ‘time-off’. 
The conditions attached to the domestic worker visa only exacerbate workers’ 
susceptibility to exploitative working practices. Firstly, domestic workers in the UK 
have to live with their employers. This allows employers to call on their workers at any 
time. As one respondent described, “If you stay [at home, the] employer ask you to do 
some jobs without pay. Much more misuse.”xx Furthermore, the employer/host family 
has the power to control access to the means of survival – accommodation and food – as 
well as power over wages and social intercourse (Anderson 2007: 255). Thus, domestic 
workers suffering exploitation are isolated in a unique and troubling manner.
The live-in requirement is also implicated in another problem domestic workers face in 
terms of their employment rights. Domestic workers in the UK are excluded from a 
number of labour standards, such as the maximum weekly working time, restrictions on 
the duration of night work and occupational health and safety legislation.xxi In addition, 
if domestic workers are ‘treated as a member of the family’ they fall under an 
exemption to the national minimum wage.xxii These issues affect all domestic workers, 
including British nationals. However, foreign nationals are more likely to fall under this 
exemption because of the live-in requirement, which constitute one of the main legal 
tests for deciding whether a domestic worker is a member of the family.xxiii In reality, 
most foreign domestic workers fall under the exemption. For instance, in a recent 
conjoined appeals case,xxiv one of the defendants – Ms. Nambalat – was found to fall 
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within the exemption given that she shared meals with the family, would watch 
television with them and was invited on family outings. Another worker – Ms. Udin – 
was found on appeal to fall within exemption despite the fact that her accommodation 
for part of her time with the family was a mattress on the dining room floor. Here, the 
court decided that poor standards of accommodation did not necessarily mean that she 
was not treated as part of the family since other members of the family were also living 
in cramped conditions at the time.
The second major issue with the domestic worker visa is its lack of employment 
portability. These are even more stringent than those attached to Tier 2 work permits. In 
particular, from 6 April 2012, the rules regarding domestic workers were amended so 
that workers are “not allowed to change employer while [they] are in the UK or change 
to a different type of employment”.xxv This amendment has been subject to outcry by 
the charity Kalayaan, who were the drivers of a campaign to end this same restriction in 
1997. They argue that the portability of the visa is key to protecting migrant workers: 
between May 2009 and December 2010, 1053 domestic workers brought 
employment tribunal cases  against their employers....Taking such action would 
be unthinkable if the worker had to continue working for their employer and 
residing in their household and would be impossible if workers lost their right to 
remain in the UK when they fled from an abusive employer. 
(Lalani 2011: 6)
Thus, these changes will increase trafficking for domestic servitude as domestic workers 
will have no way of escaping abuse and employers will know therefore that they can 
abuse and exploit with impunity (Lalani 2011; Moss 2011).
15
The current coalition government has pursued a two-pronged argument against 
charges that the aforementioned change to the working conditions attached to the visa 
will led to the increased exploitation of domestic workers. First, the fact that employers 
will have to negotiate an employment contract before they are allowed to bring in 
domestic workers is conceptualised as a mechanism for encouraging compliance with 
employment law. On the UK Border Agency website, domestic workers are told that 
they should “be paid… at least the minimum wage; not be forced to work excessive 
hours; be given agreed holiday pay; given [the] notice [they] are entitled to if [their] 
employment end”.xxvi However, the extent to which a leaflet outlining their employment 
rights at the point of obtaining a visa will be enough to protect them from exploitation is 
questionable, given that the requirement for a contract is already in place. Furthermore, in 
over 50% of cases examined in a recent study, the contracts do not contain enough information 
to ascertain whether the worker is paid the minimum wage (Clark and Kumarappan 2011).
More controversially still, the coalition government has argued that 
the biggest protection for these workers will be delivered by limiting access to 
the UK through these routes. We are restoring them to their original purpose—to 
allow visitors and diplomats to be accompanied by their domestic staff—not to 
provide permanent access to the UK for unskilled workers.
(Home Office 2012)
This ignores the fact that shutting down a legal avenue for immigration does not stem 
the flow of immigration. Instead, restrictive admissions requirements contribute to the 
‘illegalization’ of domestic work by foreign nationals. In turn, as discussed below, 
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irregular immigrants are even further excluded from the labour protections offered 
British workers.
IRREGULARLY RESIDENT
There are two elements that determine the legal framework around illegally resident 
immigrant’s employment rights: the enforceability of employment rights during 
undeclared or illegal employment, and the extent to which courts are under a duty to 
pass on information about immigration status to the relevant authorities. In the UK, 
judges are not compelled to inform the immigration authorities of irregular migrant 
status, although they are not prohibited from doing so. The possibility of discovery 
undoubtedly discourages many irregular resident migrants from making employment 
claims. 
More fundamentally, the prevailing doctrine of illegality states that where a contract is 
not legal,xxvii the employment rights that it contains are not enforceable (Dewhurst 
2012). The justification for this is deterrence and the need to protect the integrity of the 
judicial system. Despite pressure from Europe, the UK has held steadfastly onto its 
‘non-protection’ stance, opting out of an EU Directive that would have provided 
undocumented migrant workers with the right to recoup unpaid wages. The rationale 
behind the Directive was based on the principle that the obligation to pay outstanding 
remuneration could increase the cost and risk of hiring an irregular immigrant, thus 
undermining one of the key demand factors in illegal foreign employment. However, in 
response to the European Migration Network Ad Hoc Query on the payment of back 
wages to foreign illegal workers, the UK reiterated the position that the introduction of 
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provision for back pay of any outstanding remuneration to illegally employed foreign 
nationals “could encourage some illegal workers to work in the knowledge that even if 
they are identiﬁed and removed from the UK they will still be paid in full”. xxviii
The implication of the ‘doctrine of illegality’ is severe for irregular migrants, who are 
largely prevented by this measure from seeking redress in courts. To date, there are no 
cases where the illegal status of the claimant has been known to the courts and they 
have successfully made a claim on the basis of employment rights. Until recently, 
questions remained about the right of irregular immigrants (and, more generally, 
claimants with illegal contracts) to claim for discrimination because the offence of 
discrimination is based on statutory remedies as opposed to contractual claims. 
However, Hounga v. Allenxxix  has narrowed the possibilities for making a claim on this 
basis. Ms. Hounga is a Nigerian national who came to the UK in 2007 to work for the 
Allen family, where she was told she would receive £50 a month to perform housework 
and look after their children. Her age is unclear but it is estimated that she was between 
14-16 years old when she entered the arrangement. In order to obtain her passport and 
visa, Ms Hounga lied about her age and name and when she arrived in the UK, she lied 
to the immigration officers, claiming she was in the UK to visit her grandmother. Ms 
Hounga was assisted by the Allen family throughout this process. During this time she 
worked for the Allen family, she received no pay, and suffered serious physical abuse 
from Mrs Allen. She was eventually dismissed.
Ms Hounga brought a number of claims before the Employment Tribunal, who rejected 
her claims for unfair dismissal, breach of contract and unlawful deductions from wages 
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and holiday pay on the grounds that they arose out of the illegal contract. However, the 
claim for dismissal on racially discriminatory grounds was allowed because the court 
agreed that the admitted illegality—the violation of immigration rules—did not bar her 
claim based on the statutory tort of racial discrimination. The Employment Appeals 
Tribunal made a similar distinction. However, Ms. Hounga’s employers took the case to 
the Court of Appeal, who decided that all of Ms Hounga’s claims, including the 
discrimination claim, should be barred, because it was “inextricably bound up” with the 
illegality in question and therefore to permit her to recover compensation would appear 
to condone her unlawful conduct. 
Thus, judges have tended towards a strict interpretation of the doctrine of illegality, to 
the detriment of migrant workers’ employment rights. Notably, the same issues also 
affect migrant workers who are legally resident but illegally working. In Vakante v. 
Addey & Stanhope School & Others,xxx Mr. Vakante, a Croatian asylum seeker, was 
given limited leave to remain in the UK, with the condition that he did not obtain any 
paid employment. In breach of that condition, Mr. Vakante undertook paid employment 
at the Addey and Stanhope School as a trainee teacher. In the process of applying for 
this position, Mr. Vakante made several false representations to the school about his 
right to work. Mr. Vakante was dismissed by the school and subsequently made a 
complaint of race discrimination contrary to section 4 of the Race Relations Act 1976. 
However, the claimants’ claim was dismissed on grounds on illegality.
Despite these issues, a small number of irregular migrants are in fact making claims in 
court. This occurs because of the fact that employers might similarly be interested in not 
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having the illegal status of the claimant come to light, because of the risk of penalty. In 
such cases, the employer and an irregular migrant agree that the latter’s status will not 
be revealed in court. As one lawyer described, “Quite often you get into a game of bluff 
and counter bluff. They might say, the worker is illegal and then you reply, well, are 
you going to go out and admit to everyone that you have been employing someone 
illegaly?“xxxi Such cases are often settled out of court. This is one of the rare occasions 
where third party sanctions have an indirectly positive effect on irregular migrants.
CONCLUSION
The first aspect of current Conservative-Liberal coalition government’s response to 
migrants’ labour exploitation has been to criminalize and penalize the immediate actors 
perpetrating the exploitation. For instance, in response to report by the Salvation Army 
that it had witnessed an increase in domestic servitude after the visa changes came into 
effect, the Home Office replied that the most effective way to tackle the problem is to 
“target the criminal gangs behind trafficking, not blame immigration controls” (Fudge 
and Strauss 2013: 25). Likewise, the noted problems associated with Romanian and 
Bulgarian self-employment have mainly been confronted through efforts to control 
bogus self-employment. This does little to improve the living circumstances of the 
immigrants themselves. Notably, the preceding Labour government also largely resorted 
to criminal law, while avoiding responses that could be seen as ‘rewarding’ breaches of 
immigration legislation. Difficult questions about the rights of immigrants – and indeed, 
wider questions about the institutionally unequal nature of the British labour market – 
are put to one-side as the political vista focuses exclusively on the criminal actions of 
more easily identifiable villains.
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The coalition government has also argued that one of the key ways of tackling migrant 
workers’ exploitation is through limiting opportunities for legal immigration. Thus, the 
government’s overarching populist goal of reducing immigration to the ‘tens of 
thousands’ is shrouded in humanitarian concern for the immigrants’ welfare. However, 
a key concern with shutting down legal avenues for immigration is that it is associated 
with increases in illegal immigration. The argument here is that people will continue to 
move countries – compelled by war or civil strife or attracted by the idea of improving 
their economic circumstances – whether or not there are legal pathways for 
immigration. As Nicolas De Genova (2004) explores in his article on the history of the 
USA’s immigration policy on Mexico, “ostensibly restrictive immigration laws 
purportedly intended to deter migration have nonetheless been instrumental in 
sustaining Mexican migration, but only by significantly restructuring its legal status as 
undocumented” (p.161). In turn, the exclusion of illegalized immigrants from 
employment rights firmly establishes this population as powerless workers.
At the present, the most significant possibility for challenge to the UK’s immigration-
labour regime has come from the European courts. For instance, while courts in the UK 
have been firm in their commitment to the doctrine of illegality, it is questionable 
whether they should be allowed to deny relief to workers in cases where the rights 
claimed can be derived from EU law, which does not permit derogations on grounds of 
public policy. In particular, the Race Directive permits no derogations on the grounds of 
public policy from the general principle of protection against discrimination. On the 
contrary, the Race Directive clearly states that the right to equality before the law and 
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protection against discrimination constitutes a ‘universal right’ and specifically requests 
that States take the necessary measures to ensure that any “laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions contrary to the principle of equal  treatment are abolished”.xxxii 
The question therefore arises as to whether the doctrine of illegality contravenes the 
Race Directive.
Similarly, the role of legal immigration status and its impact on immigration status was 
recently questioned in Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia.xxxiii Here, the European court of 
Human Rights went beyond a ‘criminalization’ approach to trafficking to consider the 
extent of a Member state’s obligations to provide commercial regulation and 
immigration rules that deter trafficking. In particular, the Court found “that the regime 
of artiste visas in Cyprus did not afford to Ms Rantseva practical and effective 
protection against trafficking and exploitation.” In particular, it argued that the practice 
of requiring cabaret owners and managers “to lodge a bank guarantee to cover potential 
future costs associated with artistes which they have employed” contravened the 
principle that “responsibility for ensuring compliance and for taking steps in cases of non-
compliance must remain with the authorities themselves”. Further, both the Aliens and 
Immigration Service and the Limassol police were criticised for releasing Ms. Rantseva 
from police custody back into her employers’ hands, after she left her employment for 
reasons unknown.xxxiv In total, the Court ruled that the scheme amounted to a violation 
of Article 4, the prohibition on slavery and forced labour. 
The Europeanization of law is, however, not the catch-all answer to the problematic 
issues faced by migrant workers in the UK. . Given this context, it is easy to approach 
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discourses of care for migrant workers in a cynical fashion. However, contradictory 
legal regimes on migrant workers’ exploitation are perhaps better understood in terms of 
the conflicting priorities that politicians try to balance. In this analysis, politicians are 
caught between the desire to limit immigration, support business AND protect 
immigrants’ rights. To some extent, these aims reflect the desires of different groups in 
society, with the politician hopelessly trying to reconcile the demands of the public, 
lobbying human rights organisation and employers in one fellow swoop. More 
fundamentally, however, is the way in which individuals are fully capable of holding 
entirely contradictory views, in one breath condemning the negative transformations 
wrought on their neighbourhood by illegal immigrants and in another, truly horrified 
and saddened at tragedies such as the one in Morecombe Bay. In this understanding, the 
state’s ambivalent response to the exploitation of immigrant workers reflects the 
cognitive dissonance which we all apply to the foreigners in our midst.
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 Ms. Rantseva arrived in Cyprus in early 2001 on a cabaret visa. After a few days with her employer, she left a 
note saying she was going back to Russia. Ten days later, the manager of the cabaret found her in a disco and took 
her to the police asking them to declare her illegal in the country and to detain her. However, the police – in 
consultation with the Aliens and Immigration Service -  concluded that Ms Rantseva was not illegal and asked the 
manager to collect her from the police station. A day after release, Ms. Rantseva was found dead in the street below 
the apartment to which the manager had taken her.
